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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

* * *

FRIENDS OF ANIMALS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JILL C. SILVEY, in her official capacity as
Bureau of Land Management Elko District
Manager; and THE UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:18-cv-0043-LRH-(WGC)

ORDER

Before the Court is plaintiff Friends of Animals’ (“FOA”)¹ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 21). Defendants, the United States Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and Jill Silvey (“Silvey”),² filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 27). FOA then filed a response (ECF No. 30) to which defendants replied (ECF No. 33). On October 29, 2018, the court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and a similar motion in a companion case.³ For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny FOA’s motion for summary judgment and grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

¹ Friends of Animals is a non-profit international advocacy organization that, through its Wildlife Law Program, advocates on behalf of wildlife in the United States legal system.

² Defendant Silvey is the manager for the Elko District of the BLM.

³ The companion case, *American Wild Horse Campaign v. Zinke* (3:18-CV-00059-LRH-CBC), concerns the same action undertaken by BLM, but FOA challenges it on different grounds. Additionally, although the plaintiffs in both cases contest the same action, the administrative records are different. As such, the Court will issue two separate orders dispensing with both sets of motions for summary judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This action concerns the BLM's approved plan to gather, round-up, and permanently remove approximately 9,000 wild horses from the Antelope and Triple B wild horse complexes ("Antelope and Triple B Complexes") located in southeastern Elko County and northern White Pine County, Nevada pursuant to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act ("WHBA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 *et seq.*

The BLM oversees and administers the Antelope and Triple B Complexes alongside the wild horses which call the complexes home. The Antelope Complex is composed of the Antelope Herd Management Area ("HMA"),⁴ the Antelope Valley HMA, the Goshute HMA, and the Spruce-Pequot HMA. The Triple B Complex is composed of the Triple B HMA, the Maverick-Medicine HMA, and the Cherry Springs Wild Horse Territory. Together, these two wild horse complexes comprise over 2.8 million acres of public land managed by BLM.

In February 2016 and March 2017, BLM conducted wild horse population inventories throughout the Antelope and Triple B Complexes. (Administrative Record ("AR") at 365). As a result of those inventories, BLM determined there were roughly 9,525 wild horses then residing in the complexes and that wild horses were beginning to migrate outside of designated HMAs and were encroaching upon private land for forage and water. (*Id.*) The previously determined Appropriate Management Levels ("AML")⁵ for wild horse populations in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes is between 899 horses on the low range and 1,678 horses on the high range. (AR at 11). Thus, at the time of the inventories, the total wild horse population on the complexes was

⁴ A Herd Management Area is an area of public land wherein wild horse populations reside and are overseen by BLM. Each HMA has a specific geographic boundary and is unique in its terrain features, local climate, and natural resources, and, as such, is uniquely administered by BLM. Currently, BLM manages over 177 separate HMAs across 10 western states with 83 of BLM's HMAs in Nevada.

⁵ An Appropriate Management Level is an expressed wild horse population range for a designated HMA with both an upper and lower limit, within which BLM manages wild horse populations. *See Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Jewell*, 847 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2016). An AML range is determined after taking into account various factors of a particular HMA including terrain, climate, natural resources and the ability of the HMA to sustain a wild horse population. "In each HMA, BLM officials are afforded significant discretion to compute [AMLs] for the wild horse populations they manage." *Fund for Animals, Inc. v. BLM*, 460 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Further, the purpose of an AML is "to move towards a thriving natural ecological balance," and an AML is used as "a trigger by which the BLM is alerted to address population imbalance." *In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Interior*, 751 F.3d 1054, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2014).

1 eleven times greater than low AML and nearly six times greater than high AML. Based on this
2 information, BLM determined that in Spring 2017, there were over 9,000 excess wild horses living
3 in the complexes and that a gather to remove the excess wild horses was required under the WHBA
4 to bring the wild horse population back within the AML range for the Antelope and Triple B
5 Complexes.

6 Initially, defendants compiled a preliminary gather plan and Environmental Assessment
7 (“EA”) for gathering and removing excess wild horses from the complexes known as The
8 Preliminary Antelope and Triple B Complexes Gather Plan EA, DOI-BLM-NV-N030-2017-0010-
9 EA. The preferred action under the preliminary plan was to gather and permanently remove
10 approximately 6,700 wild horses from the complexes over a ten-year period, utilize population and
11 fertility controls on a portion of the remaining wild horse population, adjust the sex ratio of the
12 wild horse population within the HMAs, and manage a portion of the male wild horse population
13 as castrated geldings. The preliminary gather plan was made available for public review and
14 comment from July 21 through August 21, 2017. (AR at 196, 370). During this period, BLM
15 received approximately 4,940 comment submissions,⁶ including a comment from FOA.⁷ (AR at
16 370).

17 After the close of the public comment period, defendants prepared a final gather plan and
18 environmental assessment in December 2017: The Antelope and Triple B Complexes Gather
19 Plan EA, DOI-BLM-NV-E030-2017-0010-EA (“2017 Gather Plan”). (AR at 1–364). On
20 December 21, 2017, defendants issued a final Decision Record approving the proposed gather,
21 removal, and fertility controls outlined in Alternative A of the 2017 Gather Plan.⁸ (AR at 365–

22 ⁶ Although the BLM received almost 5000 comments during the public comment period, the Court notes
23 that 97% of those submissions (more than 4,780 of the public comments) were form letters simply opposing
24 the preliminary gather plan. *See* AR at 1626–13698.

25 ⁷ FOA submitted its own comment during the public comment period in which it claimed that the
26 preliminary gather plan failed to fully consider the environmental impacts of BLM’s proposed action. FOA
27 also presented three alternative action plans for management of the wild horse populations that did not
28 include removal of wild horses from the Antelope and Triple B Complexes.

⁸ Approved Alternative A of the 2017 Gather Plan authorizes the BLM to: (1) gather and remove
approximately 9,053 excess wild horses from the Antelope and Triple B Complexes to achieve a core
breeding population at low AML; (2) administer population control measures including the use of fertility
drugs to reduce fertility in mares; (3) adjust the sex ratios of wild horse populations to achieve a 60% male
ratio within the core breeding population; and (4) return a portion of newly gelded male horses to the

1 373). Also on December 21, 2017, defendants issued a Finding of No Significant Impact
2 (“FONSI”) for the 2017 Gather Plan, finding that “implementation of [the 2017 Gather Plan] will
3 not significantly affect the quality of the human environment” and, therefore, “preparation of an
4 Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) [was] not required as per Section 102(2)(C) of the
5 National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).” (AR at 374–377).

6 On January 25, 2018, FOA filed a complaint against defendants alleging five separate
7 causes of action: (1) violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-
8 706; (2) violation of the WHBA; (3) violation of NEPA for failing to prepare an Environmental
9 Impact Statement; (4) violation of NEPA for failing to consider and address reasonable alternatives
10 to the 2017 Gather Plan; and (5) violation of NEPA for failing to take a “hard look” at the
11 environmental impact of the 2017 Gather Plan. (ECF No. 1). On January 31, 2018, BLM conducted
12 the first roundup under the 2017 Gather Plan removing roughly 1,300 wild horses from the Triple
13 B Complex and then returning 62 horses to the complex including 28 mares treated with fertility
14 controls.

15 II. Legal Standard

16 Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
17 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no
18 genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter
19 of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, together
20 with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable
21 to the party opposing the motion. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574,
22 587 (1986); *Cnty of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp.*, 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001).

23 The moving party bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, along
24 with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*,
25 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving party

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27 complexes to bring the total wild horse population to mid-range AML. (AR at 20–21, 365–6). Further,
28 because gather efficiencies and available holding space would make it impossible for BLM to gather
approximately 9,053 excess wild horses in a single gather, Alternative A of the 2017 Gather Plan is
structured to allow for a series of roundups and population control methods over a ten-year period. *Id.*

1 must make a showing that is “sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could
2 find other than for the moving party.” *Calderone v. U.S.*, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986).

3 To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must point
4 to facts supported by the record which demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. *Reese v.*
5 *Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J*, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that might
6 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S.
7 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary
8 judgment is not appropriate. *See v. Durang*, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). A dispute regarding
9 a material fact is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
10 verdict for the nonmoving party.” *Liberty Lobby*, 477 U.S. at 248. However, the mere existence of
11 a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position will be insufficient to establish
12 a genuine dispute; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
13 nonmoving party. *See id.* at 252.

14 Where, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claims,
15 the court must consider each party’s motion separately and on its own merits, “giving the non-
16 moving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” *A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of*
17 *Las Vegas*, 466 F.3d 784, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, in evaluating the motions, “the court
18 must consider each party’s evidence, regardless under which motion the evidence is offered.” *Las*
19 *Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme*, 632 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). *See also Fair Hous. Council of*
20 *Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two*, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he court must
21 consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support of both motions,
22 and opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.”).

23 **III. Discussion**

24 In its complaint, FOA has alleged claims for violations of the APA, WHBA, and NEPA.
25 (ECF No. 1). WHBA and NEPA claims are reviewed under the same judicial review provisions as
26 claims brought directly under the APA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 706. Thus, all of the claims in this action
27 are governed by the APA.

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1 Under the APA, a federal court “shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
2 findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
3 not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). *See also Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v.*
4 *Brong*, 492 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2007). Review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
5 standard is narrow. *Lands Council v. McNair*, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the
6 arbitrary and capricious standard, the court may set aside an agency’s action as unlawfully arbitrary
7 and capricious only if: (1) the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of a problem
8 before reaching its decision; (2) the agency offered an explanation for its decision that is contrary
9 to the evidence before the agency; (3) the agency’s decision was so implausible that it could not
10 be ascribed to a difference in view or be the product of agency expertise; or (4) the agency’s
11 decision was contrary to governing law. *Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric.*, 795 F.3d
12 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2015).

13 The APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard is necessarily deferential. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs.*
14 *Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). In evaluating an agency’s
15 decision, a court “is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” *Citizens to*
16 *Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Rather, the court reviews the agency
17 action only to see if the agency “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory
18 explanation for its action,” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n.*, 463 U.S. at 43, and if the agency presented
19 a “rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions made” in the agency’s decision,
20 *Brong*, 492 F.3d at 1125.

21 In deciding whether to grant summary judgment on an APA challenge, the district court
22 “is not required to resolve any facts.” *Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS*, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir.
23 1985). Instead, the court simply determines “whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the
24 administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” *Id.*

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1 **A. Violation of the APA (Claim 1)**

2 FOA's first cause of action alleges that defendants violated the APA by departing from
3 BLM's own internal regulations and agency policy, namely BLM's own handbook governing wild
4 horse management,⁹ in approving the 2017 Gather Plan. (ECF No. 1).

5 In its motion for summary judgment, FOA argues that the 2017 Gather Plan, which allows
6 for the gathering of wild horses over a ten-year period, violates several provisions within the wild
7 horse handbook, and thus, violates the APA. (ECF No. 21). In particular, FOA argues that under
8 the 2017 Gather Plan, BLM will not be drafting separate EAs for each roundup approved under
9 the plan, will not be issuing separate decision records within the requisite time period before each
10 roundup, and will not be providing a new public comment period before each roundup as required
11 by the handbook. As such, FOA asserts that the 2017 Gather Plan is arbitrary and capricious and
12 should be set aside.¹⁰

13 The Court has reviewed the documents on file in this matter and finds that defendants are
14 entitled to summary judgment on FOA's first cause of action for violation of the APA. A District
15 Court "will review an agency's alleged noncompliance with an agency pronouncement only if that
16 pronouncement actually has the force and effect of law." *W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Espy*, 79 F.3d
17 986, 900 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing *U.S. v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots ("Fifty-Three Parrots")*,
18 685 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1982)). Even so, a court "will not review allegations of

19 ⁹ It is undisputed that BLM issued a handbook for the management of wild horses known as the Wild Horses
20 and Burros Management Handbook, BLM Handbook H-47001-1. (AR at 14986–15065). Part of the
21 handbook addresses BLM's statutory duty under the WHBA to make excess determinations and remove
22 excess wild horses from public land. In making an excess determination, the BLM handbook identifies
23 seven factors BLM should analyze in its decision including: (1) grazing utilization and distribution on an
24 HMA; (2) the ecological condition and ecological trend in an HMA; (3) actual use of the HMA by a wild
25 horse population; (4) relevant climate data; (5) the current population inventory of wild horses in an HMA;
26 (6) the presence of wild horses outside the HMA; and (7) other factors such as the results of land health
27 assessments which demonstrate removal is needed to restore or maintain the range in a thriving, natural
28 ecological balance. (*See* AR at 15016) (listing relevant factors). The handbook further provides that BLM
should only issue gather decisions thirty-one to seventy-six days before the proposed gather to allow for
public comment and that an EA should accompany each proposed gather. (AR at 15033).

¹⁰ In its motion for summary judgment, FOA also argues that the 2017 Gather Plan is arbitrary and
capricious because it was approved in violation of certain land use plans governing the Antelope and Triple
B Complexes. (ECF No. 21). FOA did not plead or allege this claim in its complaint. (ECF No. 1, ¶111-
115) (identifying the various alleged BLM policy violations). Claims cannot be raised for the first time in
summary judgment proceedings. As such, FOA's newly raised APA claim for violation of certain land use
plans shall not be considered by the court.

1 noncompliance with an agency statement that is not binding on the agency.” *Id.* To determine
2 whether an agency handbook has the independent force of law sufficient to trigger alleged
3 noncompliance review by a District Court, “the agency pronouncement must (1) prescribe
4 substantive rules – not interpretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency
5 organization, procedure or practice – and (2) conform to certain procedural requirements.” *Id.* at
6 901 (citing *Fifty-Three Parrots*, 685 F.2d at 1136). To satisfy the first requirement, the rule must
7 be legislative in nature, affecting individual rights and obligations; to satisfy the second, it must
8 have been promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority and in conformance with
9 procedural requirements imposed by Congress. *Id.*

10 Here, BLM’s wild horse handbook does not meet either of these requirements. First, the
11 handbook’s pronouncements and guidance for wild horse excess determinations and removal
12 gathers are not substantive in nature and do not create legal duties upon BLM. *See e.g., Colo. Wild*
13 *Horse & Burro Coal. v. Jewell*, 130 F. Supp.3d 205, 214 (D. D.C. 2015) (holding that provision
14 of the BLM’s wild horse handbook requiring population inventories every two years did not create
15 “a legal duty” for BLM). Second, the handbook was not promulgated in accordance with the
16 necessary formal procedural requirements because the handbook was not published in the Federal
17 Register or the Code of Federal Regulations, nor was the handbook subject to public notice and
18 comment before being issued by BLM. As such, the wild horse handbook does not have the
19 independent force and effect of law sufficient to bind BLM to its stated pronouncements for
20 purposes of an APA claim. *See W. Radio Servs., Inc.*, 79 F.3d at 901. *See also Forest Guardians*
21 *v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.*, 309 F.3d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an
22 agency manual “does not have the force of law and does not bind the agency.”)

23 The court’s finding is consistent with and supported by the District of Oregon’s recent
24 decision in *Friends of Animals v. Bureau of Land Management*, 2018 WL 1612836 (D. Or. Apr.
25 2, 2018). In that case, FOA challenged the APA BLM’s decision to remove wild horses from an
26 HMA on the basis that the BLM did not comply with its wild horse handbook in effectuating the
27 removal gather. *Id.* at *17–18. The Oregon District Court ultimately held that BLM was not
28 required to strictly comply with its handbook because the handbook did not carry the “independent

1 force and effect of law,” and thus, BLM’s proposed gather action did not violate the APA. *Id.* at
2 *18. Accordingly, the Court shall deny FOA’s motion for summary judgment and grant
3 defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on this claim.

4 **B. Violation of the WHBA (Claim 2)**

5 The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act directs BLM to manage wild horse
6 populations throughout the United States “to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological
7 balance on the public lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). As part of the mandate, the WHBA requires
8 BLM to compile and maintain “current inventor[ies] of wild horses and burros on given areas of
9 public lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1); 43 C.F.R. § 4710.2. These inventories are then used to
10 determine whether a wild horse population exceeds the AML for a designated HMA. *See* 16 U.S.C.
11 § 1333(b)(2). If an overpopulation of wild horses exists, the WHBA further mandates that BLM
12 remove the “excess” wild horses from public land. *Id.* “Where a given wild horse or burro
13 population exceeds its designated AML, BLM must decide whether to bring the herd back within
14 AML ‘by the removal or destruction of excess animals, or other options (such as sterilization, or
15 natural controls on population levels).’ ” *W. Rangeland Conservation Assoc. v. Zinke*, 265
16 F.Supp.3d 1267, 1274 (D. Utah 2017) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). In evaluating a challenge
17 to a BLM excess determination and gather plan under the WHBA, the important question for the
18 court “is whether BLM followed the applicable WHBA regulations and otherwise properly made
19 an excess determination.” *Friends of Animals v. Bureau of Land Management*, 2018 WL 1612836,
20 at *18 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 2018).

21 In its second cause of action, FOA alleges that defendants violated the WHBA when they
22 made their initial determination that there were excess wild horses on the Antelope and Triple B
23 Complexes and subsequently approved the 2017 Gather Plan based upon that erroneous excess
24 determination. (ECF No. 1). In its motion for summary judgment, FOA raises three distinct
25 arguments as to why defendants allegedly violated the WHBA. First, FOA argues defendants’
26 excess determination that an overpopulation of wild horses currently exists, and will continue to
27 exist, in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes throughout the duration of the 2017 Gather Plan
28 was not based on “current information” as required by the WHBA. Second, FOA argues

1 defendants erroneously relied on outdated AMLs for the Antelope and Triple B Complexes in both
2 the excess determination and the 2017 Gather Plan. Finally, FOA argues that the 2017 Gather Plan
3 does not constitute management of wild horses at the “minimal feasible level” as required under
4 the WHBA. The Court shall address each argument below.

5 1. “Current Information”

6 FOA contends that defendants’ 2017 decision approving a ten-year gather plan was not
7 based on “current information” for future roundups authorized under the 2017 Gather Plan. (ECF
8 No. 21). In particular, FOA contends that the WHBA requires that every wild horse “excess”
9 determination and subsequent round up of wild horses be based on current information. *See* 16
10 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1). It argues that defendants did not have the required information in
11 December 2017 when they approved the 2017 Gather Plan, which stated that removal of wild
12 horses from the Antelope and Triple B Complexes will still be necessary ten years from now as
13 range conditions and wild horse populations can fluctuate over such a long period. Further, FOA
14 insists that defendants cannot act on the basis of current wild horse population inventories and
15 information in approving a ten-year gather plan. Nevertheless, defendants approved Alternative A
16 of the 2017 Gather Plan, which authorizes an undetermined number of roundups throughout the
17 Antelope and Triple B Complexes over the next ten years. As such, FOA argues the 2017 Gather
18 Plan, which authorizes round ups until 2027, is arbitrary and capricious.

19 Initially, the Court notes that FOA’s argument is premised on a fundamental
20 misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the WHBA’s excess determination requirements. FOA
21 mischaracterizes the plain language of the WHBA to require BLM to make a new excess
22 determination for each and every round up authorized under a gather plan and base that new excess
23 determination on information then available at the time of that particular round up. Such an
24 interpretation of the WHBA is in direct conflict with the specific language of the statute which
25 “entitles BLM to act ‘on the basis of all information currently available to [it]’ ” in making its
26 excess determination. *Colorado Wild Horse v. Jewell*, 130 F.Supp.3d 205, 214 (D. D.C. 2015)
27 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)). *See also Am. Horse Protection Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt*, 694 F.2d 1310,
28 1318 (D. D.C. 1982) (holding that the WHBA specifically authorizes BLM to act “on the bases of

1 whatever information [it] has at the time of [its] decision.”). Contrary to FOA’s argument, the
2 WHBA contemplates a single excess determination prior to approval of a gather plan. There is no
3 requirement that a separate determination be made for each individual round up approved under a
4 gather plan and the court shall not read such a requirement into the WHBA. *See e.g., Friends of*
5 *Animals v. Bureau of Land Management*, 232 F.Supp.3d 53, 63 (D. D.C. 2017) (holding that
6 FOA’s argument that BLM must issue an EA or other document “for every individual gather ...
7 reads too much into BLM’s” statutory duties).

8 Second, the Court finds that defendants’ determination that there were excess wild horses
9 on the Antelope and Triple B Complexes was based on the information available to them at the
10 time of their decision in December 2017, and thus, their decision did not violate the WHBA. Prior
11 to drafting the 2017 Gather Plan, defendants compiled substantial data regarding the utilization of
12 forage and water by all animals throughout the Antelope and Triple B Complexes as well as trends
13 in ecological conditions and climate patterns. (AR at 58–64). The data defendants compiled and
14 then relied upon in their decision included information about current wild horse populations (based
15 on inventories in 2016 and 2017), current livestock grazing in the complexes, and ecological and
16 climate trends in the complexes. *Id.* Additionally, defendants compiled several monitoring and
17 utilization reports in 2017 which provided the most current information about HMA conditions.
18 (AR at 26503–27411). After considering this information, defendants concluded that “[w]ild horse
19 population and resource monitoring data shows that current wild horse populations are exceeding
20 the range’s ability to sustain them.” (AR at 369). The Court finds that the information defendants
21 compiled and relied upon in support of the 2017 Gather Plan complied with the WHBA’s mandate
22 that BLM act “on the basis of all information currently available to [it.]” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2).

23 Finally, FOA’s argument fails in light of the widely accepted understanding that the
24 WHBA “conveys Congress’s view that BLM’s findings of wild horse overpopulations should not
25 be overturned quickly on the ground that they are predicated on insufficient information.” *Am.*
26 *Horse Protection Ass’n*, 694 F.2d at 1318. *See also In Def. of Animals*, 751 F.3d at 1066 (finding
27 that agency expertise deserves deference when an overpopulation exists and action is warranted).
28 FOA’s challenge to the 2017 Gather Plan essentially boils down to requiring that BLM act only

1 upon perfect and up to date information at all times of a gather plan. Perfect information, however,
2 is almost never available when predicting future environmental factors and effects. Moreover, such
3 information is not required under the WHBA before BLM issues a decision pursuant to its statutory
4 mandate. Therefore, the Court finds that defendants' excess determination under the WHBA and
5 subsequent removal plan as outlined in Alternative A of the 2017 Gather Plan was not arbitrary
6 and capricious.

7 2. Reliance on Outdated AMLs

8 FOA also argues that the 2017 Gather Plan is arbitrary and capricious because it is based
9 in part on outdated AMLs for several of the HMAs within the Antelope and Triple B Complexes
10 that BLM had previously committed to reevaluate. (ECF No. 21). In particular, FOA contends that
11 several AMLs and land use plans in a few HMAs will not be valid for the life of the 2017 Gather
12 Plan without being reevaluated pursuant to the terms of the relevant land use plans, and thus,
13 defendants could not rely on these AMLs to support the 2017 Gather Plan. In opposition,
14 defendants argue that their reliance on the previously approved AMLs was not a violation of the
15 WHBA. (ECF No. 27).

16 The Court agrees with defendants. There is no language in the WHBA "requir[ing] the
17 BLM to determine new AMLs based on current conditions every time the BLM decides to take
18 action to restore the already-established AMLs." *In Def. of Animals*, 751 F.3d at 1064, n. 13. *See*
19 *also Friends of Animals v. Bureau of Land Management*, 2018 WL 1612836, at *18 (D. Or. Apr.
20 2, 2018) ("FOA provides, and the Court has found, no case law to support FOA's contention that
21 BLM has an obligation to show that the AML 'applies' or remains valid in a given HMA before
22 relying on it[.]"). In fact, notwithstanding FOA's argument to the contrary, the WHBA "does not
23 create a statutory obligation for BLM to recalculate the AML at every gather." *Friends of Animals*,
24 2018 WL 1612836, at *18. Instead, BLM is given great deference both in establishing AMLs and
25 in reevaluating established AMLs. *See Habitat for Horses v. Salazar*, 745 F.Supp.2d 438, 453
26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

27 Furthermore, re-evaluation of an AML is a time-consuming process requiring ongoing
28 monitoring and activity by BLM. Under the WHBA, BLM is mandated to "immediately remove

1 excess wild horses from the range so as to achieve [AMLs].” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2). It would run
2 counter to the WHBA’s statutory mandate to reevaluate an established AML prior to every
3 removal decision. Thus, while the AMLs relied on in the 2017 Gather Plan have not been amended
4 in the past few years, these AMLs are the currently applicable and established AMLs for the project
5 area and BLM was required to rely on them in support of its excess determination. *In Def. of*
6 *Animals*, 751 F.3d at 1064, n. 13. Therefore, BLM’s reliance on the previously approved and
7 established AMLs was not arbitrary and capricious.

8 3. Minimally Feasible Level

9 Finally, FOA argues that the 2017 Gather Plan violates the WHBA because managing a
10 portion of the wild horse population as castrated/gelded horses does not constitute management at
11 the minimal feasible level as required under the WHBA’s provisions. (ECF No. 21).

12 As an initial matter, FOA failed to plead or otherwise raise this WHBA claim in its
13 complaint, and it cannot now pursue the claim on summary judgment. As pled in its complaint,
14 FOA’s WHBA claim only challenged the 2017 Gather Plan’s excess and removal determinations.
15 (ECF No. 1, ¶ 117) (“On the above facts and legal obligations, Defendants violated the WHBA by
16 failing to make an appropriate determination that wild horses were excess and removal is necessary
17 prior to authorizing the permanent removal of horses over a ten-year period from the Antelope and
18 Triple B Complexes.”). Nowhere in this claim did FOA challenge the 2017 Gather Plan’s proposal
19 of returning a portion of geldings under the “minimal feasible language” of the WHBA. Rather,
20 FOA challenged the return of geldings to the Antelope and Triple B Complexes under NEPA, as
21 alleged in FOA’s third and fifth cause of action. (ECF No. 1). Therefore, the court shall dismiss
22 this newly raised claim with prejudice.

23 But even if FOA had pled this claim in its complaint, the Court finds that defendants’
24 decision to utilize population control measures, including gelding of stallions, a portion of which
25 are then returned back to the Antelope and Triple B Complexes, reasonably constitutes
26 management of wild horses at the minimal feasible level and therefore was not arbitrary and
27 capricious. *See In Def. of Animals*, 751 F.3d at 1057-59 (finding that applying population control
28 measures was management at the minimal feasible level). The only difference between past gather

1 plans and the 2017 Gather Plan is that some geldings would be released back to the Antelope and
2 Triple B Complexes instead of being shipped off for adoption or sale. Under the WHBA, BLM
3 has explicit authority to utilize a range of population control measures, in addition to directly
4 removing and euthanizing excess horses, to manage wild horse populations to reach an established
5 AML range. *W. Rangeland Conservation Assoc.*, 265 F.Supp.3d at 1274.

6 FOA reads far more into the phrase “minimal feasible level” than the statute permits. The
7 WHBA’s requirement that “[a]ll management activities shall be at the minimal feasible level,” 16
8 U.S.C. § 1333(a), can reasonably be read and interpreted, as BLM interprets the statute, to mean
9 that BLM shall use “[t]he minimum number of habitat or population management tools or actions
10 necessary to attain the objectives” for an HMA. The 2017 Gather Plan complies with this
11 interpretation, as returning horses that would already be gelded back to the range does not increase
12 the number of population management actions that BLM must take, and gelding provides a
13 permanent way to render part of the herd non-reproducing. FOA’s argument improperly reads
14 NEPA requirements into the WHBA, suggesting that the WHBA provision does not permit
15 “controversial” management actions or actions that have not been thoroughly studied. Such an
16 interpretation is beyond the plain meaning of the WHBA. Because BLM’s interpretation of the
17 statute is reasonable and faithful to the plain meaning of the statutory terms of the WHBA, it shall
18 not be rejected by the Court in favor of FOA’s broad and baseless alternative. FOA has not
19 established that defendants’ gelding proposal would add additional material management actions
20 to those otherwise planned by BLM. In fact, FOA has failed to identify any specific managerial
21 conduct or intrusive action because of the gelding proposal that is not already identified in the
22 2017 Gather Plan for the other population control measures and BLMs monitoring of wild horse
23 populations in general. Thus, contrary to FOA’s unsubstantiated claims, managing a portion of the
24 wild horse population as non-breeding geldings does not violate WHBA’s requirement for
25 management at the minimum feasible level. Accordingly, the court shall deny FOA’s motion for
26 summary judgment and grant defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the entirety of
27 FOA’s second cause of action for violation of the WHBA.

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1 **C. Violation of NEPA – EIS (Claim 3)**

2 FOA's third cause of action alleges that defendants' failure to prepare an Environmental
3 Impact Statement prior to approving the 2017 Gather Plan violates NEPA. (ECF No. 1).

4 The National Environmental Policy Act is Congress' basic "national charter for protection
5 of the environment." *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th
6 Cir. 2003). NEPA serves two fundamental purposes: (1) to require agencies to consider detailed
7 information concerning significant environmental impacts of a proposed action; and (2) to inform
8 the public that an agency has considered the environmental impacts in its decision-making process
9 while ensuring that the public can access and contribute to the decision-making process via
10 comments. *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 322, 349 (1989); *San Luis*
11 *Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n*, 449 F.3d 1016, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006).
12 NEPA does not impose any direction or restriction on the ultimate action of an agency. *Hillsdale*
13 *Env'tl. Loss Prev. v. U.S. Army of Engineers*, 702 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). Instead, "NEPA
14 imposes procedural, information-gathering requirements on an agency[.]" *Id.*

15 To meet the goals of NEPA, an agency must prepare an EIS for any major federal action
16 "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."¹¹ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). An EIS
17 is a formal statement outlining and identifying "the environmental impacts of the proposed action,
18 any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
19 [and] alternatives to the proposed action." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii). Prior to preparing a
20 formal EIS, an agency first prepares an Environmental Assessment to determine whether the
21 agency's proposed action actually requires the preparation of a formal EIS, or instead simply
22 warrants a FONSI. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; *Friends of Animals v. Sparks*, 200 F.Supp.3d 1114, 1119
23 (D. Mont. 2016) (recognizing that BLM regularly prepares an EA to evaluate potential
24 environmental impacts of a proposed plan before conducting wild horse gathers).

25 _____
26 ¹¹ The term "human environment" has been "interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and
27 physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14. "In the
28 context of wild horse gathers, [courts have] interpreted 'human environment' to encompass 'not solely [the
environmental impact] on the rangelands, but [the environmental impact] on the horses as well.'" *In Def.*
of Animals, 751 F.3d at 1068, n. 22 (quoting *Am. Horse Protection Ass'n v. Andrus*, 608 F.2d 811, 814 (9th
Cir. 1979)).

1 In contrast to a formal EIS, an EA is a “concise public document” that “[b]riefly provide[s]
2 sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an [EIS].” *Dep’t of Transp. v.*
3 *Pub. Citizen*, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004). In drafting an EA, NEPA does not impose substantive
4 obligations upon an agency; rather NEPA simply requires that an agency take a “hard look” at the
5 environmental consequences of its decision-making. *Robertson*, 409 U.S. at 350; *Friends of*
6 *Animals v. Bureau of Land Management*, 2018 WL 1612836, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 2018) (“Thus,
7 the Ninth Circuit has affirmed that the important question is whether the agency has taken a ‘hard
8 look’ at the environmental impacts of a proposed action.”). This hard look includes determining
9 whether the agency adequately evaluated all potential environmental impacts of the proposed
10 action, analyzed all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action, and identified and disclosed to
11 the public all foreseeable impacts of the proposed action. *See* 42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(C). If, after
12 completion of an EA, “an agency determines that the contemplated federal action will not
13 significantly affect the environment, ‘the federal action may issue a finding of no significant
14 impact ... in lieu of preparing an EIS.’” *Friends of Animals*, 2018 WL 1612823, at *2 (quoting
15 *Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell*, 599 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2010)).

16 In reviewing a decision not to prepare an EIS under NEPA, the court “employ[s] an
17 arbitrary and capricious standard that requires [the court] to determine whether the agency has
18 taken a ‘hard look’ at the consequences of its actions, based [its decision] on a consideration of the
19 relevant factors, and provided a convincing statement of reasons to explain why a project’s impacts
20 are insignificant.” *In Def. of Animals*, 751 F.3d at 1068 (citing *Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest*
21 *Serv. (“EPIC”)*, 451 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2006)). Generally, “[a]gencies consider two broad
22 factors to determine whether an action may ‘significantly affect’ the environment[:] ‘context’ and
23 ‘intensity.’” *Id.* (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27). “Context simply delimits the scope of the agency’s
24 action, including the interest affected.” *Id.* (quoting *National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.*
25 *Babbitt*, 241 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Intensity refers to the ‘severity of impact,’ and the
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1 regulations identify ten factors that agencies should consider in evaluating intensity.” *Id.* (citing
2 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1)-(10) (listing factors)).¹²

3 If substantial questions are raised as to whether a proposed project “may cause significant
4 degradation of some human environmental factor” then a formal EIS is required before approval
5 of the agency action. *Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n*, 573 F.3d 916, 929 (9th Cir.
6 2009). An action is “highly controversial” when “a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature,
7 or effect of the major federal action[.]” *Human Soc’y of the U.S. v. Locke*, 626 F.3d 1040, 1047
8 (9th Cir. 2010). “A substantial dispute exists when evidence ... casts serious doubt upon the
9 reasonableness of the agency’s conclusions.” *Babbitt*, 241 F.3d at 736. In making this assessment,
10 a court must not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. *Okanogan Highlands Alliance v.*
11 *Williams*, 236 F.3d 468, 473 (9th Cir. 2000).

12 In its motion, FOA argues that the ultimate environmental effects of the 2017 Gather Plan
13 are “highly controversial” and thus, defendants were required to prepare an EIS prior to approving
14 the gather. As such, defendants’ approval of the gather plan absent an EIS violates NEPA and was
15 an arbitrary and capricious decision. FOA raises several challenges to the 2017 Gather Plan which
16 it argues establishes that the gather plan is highly controversial.

17 First, FOA argues that a change to the boundary area between the preliminary gather plan,
18 which identified a gather area of over 3 million acres, and the approved 2017 Gather Plan, which
19 identifies a gather area of 2.8 million acres, establishes that there is a substantial dispute as to the
20 size of the gather. (ECF No. 21). FOA’s argument is without merit. It is undisputed that in the
21 preliminary gather plan EA, BLM identified that the prospective gather area was over 3 million

22 ¹² The intensity factors enumerated by 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) include: (1) impacts that may be both
23 beneficial and adverse; (2) the degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety; (3) unique
24 characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime
25 farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas; (4) the degree to which the effects
26 on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial; (5) the degree to which the
27 possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks; (6)
28 the degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions; (7) whether the action is related
to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts; (8) the degree to which
the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing
in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural,
or historical resources; (9) the degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened
species or its habitat; and (10) whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law.

1 acres. Then in response to a public comment that the acreage figures used in the preliminary gather
2 plan EA were higher than the established acreage in the HMAs and land use plans for the Antelope
3 and Triple B Complexes, BLM reviewed the record for each HMA and concluded that the
4 boundaries of four HMAs had been incorrectly measured and incorporated into the preliminary
5 gather EA. BLM then corrected the gather acreage in the 2017 Gather Plan to reflect the actual
6 acreage and boundaries for each HMA as established in the governing land use plans and explained
7 the reason for the boundary change. (AR at 351–364). More importantly, BLM directly analyzed
8 the relevant environmental concerns when the error occurred including the effect of the boundary
9 change on each HMA’s AML range and the effect the proposed action would have on the AMLs
10 under the correct boundaries. (AR at 351) (“Even if the slightly higher acreage value given for [the
11 HMAs] at the time the AMLs were established resulted in proportionally higher AMLs for those
12 HMAs, this would not affect the proposed action and gather plan described in the Final EA.”).
13 Because BLM did not change the acreage in the governing land use plans, BLM is not required to
14 re-analyze issues previously addressed in its land use plan NEPA analysis. The Court finds that
15 this boundary change, which is reflected in the administrative record, is not highly controversial,
16 nor does it raise substantial questions about the proposed action to trigger an EIS.

17 Second, FOA asserts that the 2017 Gather Plan’s proposed use of gelding and other fertility
18 controls to limit population growth in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes is highly controversial
19 because these procedures involve unique risks to the health of the wild horse populations. In
20 particular, FOA contends that BLM’s decision to release geldings back into the complexes as a
21 management tool is untested and not scientifically supported. FOA argues that several wild horse
22 experts who submitted comments during the public comment period expressed their concern that
23 castrating wild horses will affect the “fundamental process” of wild horse behavior (AR at 1396),
24 will cause undue suffering to the gelded horses (AR at 821), and will “destroy” the social dynamics
25 of wild horse herds (AR at 877–881). Thus, because there is no definitive scientific consensus on
26 the impact of managing castrated stallions within existing wild horse herds, FOA argues that an
27 EIS should have been prepared prior to approval of the 2017 Gather Plan.

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1 In opposition, defendants argue that the 2017 Gather Plan’s use of geldings and fertility
2 controls is not highly controversial and does not involve highly uncertain or unique risks. (ECF
3 No. 27). The court agrees. Initially, the court finds that FOA fails to demonstrate that the effects
4 of the proposed population controls are highly controversial, highly uncertain, or involve unique
5 or unknown risks for purposes of NEPA. *See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne*, 588
6 F.3d 701, 712 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that for an action’s effects to be “highly uncertain” there
7 must be more than just “some uncertainty” about the proposed action). Even granting that this will
8 be the largest and longest gather action conducted in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes, the
9 2017 Gather Plan’s foreseeable effects are entirely precedential and non-controversial: the return
10 of the wild horse population to the long-established AMLs. Achieving and maintaining established
11 AMLs through a combination of both permanent removal of wild horses and other population
12 control methods is a routine practice of BLM. In fact, it has been a long-standing practice of BLM
13 to use both fertility controls (including injecting immunocontraceptives into mares) and the
14 skewing of the stallion-to-mare ration to achieve a specific wild horse population sex ratio since
15 at least 1992, and the comments on the preliminary gather plan and FOA’s arguments to the
16 contrary do not indicate that these practices are “highly controversial.” Further, at least one sister
17 court of this district has held that use of fertility controls was not “highly controversial” back in
18 2011, and thus, did not require an EIS as a matter of law. *See Cloud Foundation v. BLM*, 802 F.
19 Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2011). Moreover, FOA has not presented any evidence that “casts serious
20 doubt” upon the reasonableness of BLM’s conclusions, and thus the court finds that the effects of
21 those actions were not highly controversial at the time BLM issued the FONSI. *See Locke*, 626
22 F.3d at 1057.

23 Similarly, the record does not establish any substantial dispute or high uncertainty over the
24 management effects of releasing geldings into the complexes that would require an EIS. Gelding
25 horses is hardly a new process and is a common surgical procedure used by BLM. (AR at 24)
26 (“BLM routinely gelds all excess male horses that are captured and removed from the range prior
27 to their adoption, sale, or shipment to off-range holding facilities.”). And although there is some
28 uncertainty about gelding behavior in the wild compared to gelding behavior as adopted horses,

1 that uncertainty alone does not warrant an EIS. *See Kempthorne*, 588 F.3d at 712. And, in contrast
2 to FOA’s argument, defendants detailed the possible effects and impacts of releasing gelded
3 stallions back into the complexes. (AR at 25) (“Management of a gelding population would allow
4 management at mid-AML, instead of gathering and removing excess animals at low AML”), (AR
5 at 152) (noting that “castration is thought to increase survival as males are released from the cost
6 or reproduction;” and that “there is absolutely no evidence based on available research or
7 observation that would suggest that a gelded wild horse would have its movements hindered or
8 would become docile or obedient simply as a result of castration.”). In fact, defendants spent
9 fourteen pages of the 2017 Gather Plan addressing the effects of releasing geldings back into the
10 wild. (AR at 141–54).

11 Third, FOA argues that defendants’ decision to remove 95 percent of wild horses from the
12 public lands will substantially destroy a historic and cultural resource. This argument is also
13 without merit. FOA’s allegations that the proposed action may have a significant impact on cultural
14 and historical resources, specifically wild horses, is unsupported and contrary to NEPA. In fact,
15 the WHBA does not describe or define wild horses as cultural resources, and defendants’ similar
16 statement in the 2017 Gather Plan was not in error. (AR at 310–11) (“Research regarding the wild
17 horse as part of the historic cultural landscape revealed that wild horses are not discussed in historic
18 and pioneer journals, indicating their presence and impact on the [historic] environment . . . was
19 minimal, if present at all.”).

20 Fourth, FOA argues that the nearly 5,000 public comments that BLM received on the
21 preliminary gather plan indicates that the plan is highly controversial and that an EIS was required.
22 But the fact that BLM received 4,490 comments during the public notice and comment period does
23 not make the action “significant.” Notably, 97 percent of the comments received were form letters
24 generally opposing the plan. Moreover, the number of total public comments is irrelevant. *See*
25 *Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 428 F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that
26 the mere “existence of opposition to a proposed agency action does not render that action ‘highly
27 controversial.’”).

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1 Finally, FOA claims that the gather will improperly establish a precedent for future actions
2 by encouraging future roundups of this scope and intensity. This argument, however, is foreclosed
3 by Ninth Circuit precedent which holds that EAs are “highly specific to the project and the locale,
4 thus creating no binding precedent” for future actions. *Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.*, 655 F.3d
5 1124, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011).

6 Based on all the above, the Court concludes that BLM considered the relevant intensity
7 factors prior to issuing its FONSI and provided a reasonable and convincing statement of reasons
8 explaining why the 2017 Gather Plan’s environmental impacts were expected to be insignificant,
9 and that an EIS was not required. *See e.g., S. Union Co. v. Sw. Gas Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1001, 1009
10 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, defendants’ decision to not prepare an EIS prior to approval of the 2017
11 Gather Plan was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court shall deny FOA’s motion for
12 summary judgment and grant defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment on FOA’s third
13 cause of action for violation of NEPA.

14 **D. Violation of NEPA – Reasonable Alternatives (Claim 4)**

15 “NEPA requires agencies to explore reasonable alternatives to a proposed action and to
16 briefly discuss the reasons other alternatives were eliminated from detailed consideration.” *Friends*
17 *of Animals v. Bureau of Land Management*, 2018 WL 1612836, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 2, 2018) (citing
18 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a)). The “purpose and need” of an agency’s project determine the appropriate
19 range of such alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13. In the 2017 Gather Plan, the project purpose is
20 identified as the need “to prevent undue or unnecessary degradation of the public lands associated
21 with excess wild horses, to restore a thriving natural ecological balance and multiple-use
22 relationship on public lands, consistent with the provision of Section 1333(b) of the [WHBA].”
23 (AR at 17). The Ninth Circuit affords agencies “considerable discretion to define the purpose and
24 need of a project.” *Friends of Se. Future v. Morrison*, 153 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998).

25 FOA’s fourth cause of action alleges that defendants violated NEPA by failing to respond
26 to public comments raised in response to the preliminary gather plan and to consider reasonable
27 alternatives in the 2017 Gather Plan. In particular, FOA argues that defendants failed to consider
28 the three alternatives FOA proposed in its public comment: (1) reevaluating current AMLs; (2)

1 using natural controls, including the protection of predators, to reduce wild horse populations; and
2 (3) adjusting the forage allocated to cattle and sheep to provide more forage for wild horses.

3 When preparing an EA, agencies are only required to conduct brief discussions of
4 reasonable, feasible alternatives that are reasonably related to the purpose of the project. *See*
5 *Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 376 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir. 2004). *See also Native*
6 *Ecosystems*, 428 F.3d at 1246 (stating that “an agency’s obligation to consider alternatives under
7 an EA is a lesser one than under an EIS.”); *Cal. Trout v. F.E.R.C.*, 572 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir.
8 2009) (holding that “NEPA does not require federal agencies to ‘assess ... consider ... [and]
9 respond’ to public comments on an EA to the same degree as it does for an EIS.”). Agencies are
10 not required to “consider alternatives which are infeasible, ineffective, or inconsistent with the
11 basic policy objectives for the management of the area.” *Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM*, 914 F.2d 1174,
12 1180 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, in rejecting any alternative, the agency must only include a brief
13 discussion of the alternative, and the agency may reject it without a detailed discussion so long as
14 the agency provided “an appropriate explanation ...as to why [the alternative] was eliminated.”
15 *Native Ecosystems Council*, 428 F.3d at 1246. Further, so long as “reasonable alternatives’ have
16 been considered,” there is no “minimum number of alternatives that an agency must consider.”
17 *Native Ecosystems Council*, 428 F.3d at 1246 (deeming sufficient the consideration of two
18 alternatives including the no-action alternative).

19 Here, as addressed below, the Court finds that defendants have satisfied their obligations
20 under NEPA to consider reasonable alternatives to the approved action, including the alternatives
21 proposed by FOA. FOA’s first proposed alternative was for BLM to re-evaluate all the AMLs in
22 the Antelope and Triple B Complexes before approving a gather plan and conducting a wild horse
23 gather. In its motion, FOA argues that re-evaluating the AMLs is a reasonable alternative to
24 approved Alternative A of the 2017 Gather Plan. (ECF No. 21). The Court disagrees. Reevaluating
25 and adjusting the AMLs throughout the Antelope and Triple B Complexes is outside the scope of
26 the project’s identified purpose and need of reducing wild horse population growth rates. FOA has
27 failed to provide any support to show how a reevaluation and adjustment in AMLs would reduce
28 the wild horse populations on the Antelope and Triple B Complexes or in any way promote the

1 health of existing wild horse populations. As such, BLM was not required to address this
2 alternative as a matter of law. *See Headwaters, Inc.*, 914 F.2d at 1180. *See also Friends of the*
3 *Earth v. Coleman*, 513 F.2d 295, 297-298 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that “[t]his court has construed
4 NEPA § 102(a)(C) as not requiring an agency to examine every conceivable alternative, but only
5 those that are reasonable.”). But BLM did address this proposal in the 2017 Gather Plan and
6 concluded that “[m]onitoring data collected within the Complexes does not indicate that an
7 increase in AML is warranted at this time,” and in fact “confirms the need to remove excess wild
8 horses.” (AR at 34). Thus, despite not being required to even address this public comment and
9 proposed alternative, defendants considered this alternative, but reasonably eliminated it from
10 analysis as a viable alternative to Alternative A of the 2017 Gather Plan because it was contrary to
11 the principles of the WHBA.

12 FOA’s second proposed alternative was for BLM to manage the excess wild horse
13 population in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes through natural means by protecting the wild
14 horses’ natural predators. (ECF No. 21). BLM also reasonably eliminated this proposal from
15 further consideration as it clearly did not meet the purpose and need of the 2017 Gather Plan. In
16 the 2017 Gather Plan, defendants concluded that wild horses in these complexes are not adequately
17 regulated by predators, have high foal survival rates, and “do not self-regulate their population
18 growth rate.” (AR at 35). Defendants then concluded that management by natural means was not
19 a reasonable alternative because it had not been feasible in the past as the major predators did not
20 exist in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes and the alternative would result in less forage, poorer
21 body condition, and decreased survival of wild horses. (AR at 35–6) (finding that “[t]his alternative
22 would result in a steady increase in the wild horse populations which would continue to exceed
23 the carrying capacity of the range resulting in a catastrophic mortality of wild horses in the
24 complexes, and irreparable damage to rangeland resources.”). Moreover, FOA’s proposed
25 alternative is contrary to BLM management objectives and various statutory and regulatory
26 mandates because the WHBA requires BLM to prevent range deterioration and manage wild
27 horses as “healthy animals.” As FOA’s proposed alternative of protecting predators would not
28

1 have met the purpose and need identified in the 2017 Gather Plan, the Court finds that defendants
2 properly considered and eliminated it from consideration.

3 FOA's third and final proposed alternative was for BLM to reduce the number of cattle and
4 sheep allowed to graze in the Antelope and Triple B Complexes to improve the range conditions.
5 The Court likewise finds that defendants' elimination of this proposed alternative was not arbitrary
6 and capricious. In the 2017 Gather Plan, defendants explained that this alternative would simply
7 exchange a limited amount of current forage used by livestock for use by wild horses, which would
8 not meet the purpose and need of the project to reduce wild horse growth rates; moreover, the
9 proposed alternative would not conform to existing land use plans. (AR 34–5). Further, FOA's
10 livestock alternative was outside the scope of the BLM's authority to manage wild horse
11 populations under the WHBA because changes to livestock grazing allotments must be made
12 through a separate process and not through wild horse gathers. Thus, this alternative was properly
13 considered and eliminated.

14 Therefore, as addressed above, defendants reasonably addressed and adequately responded
15 to FOA's proposed alternatives and FOA repeatedly ignores evidence in the record showing
16 defendants gave due consideration to its proposed alternatives, even though the alternatives were
17 outside the purpose and need of the 2017 Gather Plan. Accordingly, the court shall deny FOA's
18 motion for summary judgment and grant defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment as to
19 FOA's fourth cause of action for violation of NEPA.

20 **E. Violation of NEPA - Hard Look (Claim 5)**

21 FOA's last cause of action alleges that defendants failed to take a "hard look" at the
22 environmental impact of the approved 2017 Gather Plan as required by NEPA. (ECF No. 1).
23 Specifically, FOA argues that defendants failed to take a hard look at the impact that releasing
24 gelded/castrated wild horses will have on the behavior and physiology of wild horses, specific herd
25 dynamics, and the genetic diversity of the herds. Further, FOA contends that members of the public
26 and wild horse advocacy organizations submitted comments to defendants in response to the
27 preliminary gather plan detailing multiple concerns from wild horse experts that castrating wild
28 horses will have a significant impact on wild horses and strip them of their free-roaming behaviors.

1 Finally, FOA contends that removing 95 percent of the wild horses from the Antelope and Triple
2 B Complexes will have an adverse impact on the genetic diversity of the horses and that defendants
3 did not appropriately address this significant issue. Thus, FOA argues that defendants violated
4 NEPA by failing to appropriately address these issues or examine FOA's presented information.

5 The Court has reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter and finds that
6 defendants did take the appropriate "hard look" at the impacts of the proposed gather plan to
7 comply with NEPA. Initially, the Court notes that this challenge raises several of the same issues
8 addressed in FOA's third cause of action for a violation of NEPA as it relates to the release of
9 gelded wild horses back into the Antelope and Triple B Complexes. The Court's finding as to that
10 claim are equally applicable to this claim, so the Court will not repeat its findings and conclusions
11 here.

12 Additionally, the Court finds that BLM sufficiently analyzed possible effects and impacts
13 to geldings based on currently available studies. BLM provided thorough and reasoned
14 explanations, throughout the record, addressing the impact of the proposed action's gelding
15 component based on current studies. (AR at 141–54). And as addressed above, BLM is not required
16 to recite its assessment, consideration, and response to every comment on a EA. *See Native*
17 *Ecosystems*, 428 F.3d at 1246. Contrary to FOA's allegation, the mere possibility of unknown
18 effects by a proposed action does not render defendants' ultimate conclusion approving that action
19 arbitrary and capricious. *See Kempthorne*, 588 F.3d at 712. Moreover, the fact that there are no
20 field studies of gelded wild horse being returned to the range in the West is not a reason to discount
21 the informed opinion of those with extensive background on wild horses. *N. Plains Res. Council,*
22 *Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 668 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that "in reviewing
23 scientific judgments and technical analyses within the agency's expertise," the court is generally
24 "at its most deferential.").

25 The Court further finds that defendants complied with NEPA by taking a hard look at the
26 characteristics of the geographic area, impact of returning geldings to the range, and genetic
27 impacts of the wild horse gather. FOA may subjectively believe that defendants' chosen outcome
28 harms wild horse populations, but FOA's subjective belief does not constituted a NEPA violation.

1 More importantly, FOA ignores the legal obligation that public ranges be managed for multiple
2 uses, “not merely for the maximum protection of wild horses,” and thus, some removal of wild
3 horses and associated population controls is necessary to protect the livelihood of the herd. *Am.*
4 *Horse Prot. Ass’n*, 694 F.2d at 1317.

5 In its motion, FOA argues defendants failed to analyze or consider the public comments,
6 including studies submitted by Drs. Allen Rutberg, Bruce Nock, Jay Kirkpatrick, and Anne Perkins
7 in approving the 2017 Gather Plan. The administrative record, however, establishes that defendants
8 specifically considered and responded to comments from these alleged wild horse experts, noting
9 that their opinions were speculative and not based on the commenter’s own research. (AR at 288,
10 302–3). Further, BLM stated that the “opinions about behavioral effects of gelding by Drs.
11 Rutberg, Nock, or Kirkpatrick are speculative, given that none of them has conducted a study on
12 topic.” (AR at 288). Moreover, the existence of differing opinions on the environmental impacts
13 does not invalidate BLM’s expertise and conclusions, which are supported by the Final EA’s
14 review of the existing literature on the effects of geldings, and they are entitled to deference by the
15 Court. *N. Plains Res. Council, Inc.*, 668 F.3d at 1075.

16 Similarly, as to FOA’s claim that defendants failed to take a hard look at the genetic
17 diversity of the horses, including unique herd characteristics, the Court finds that defendants also
18 appropriately addressed this issue in the 2017 Gather Plan. Initially, the Court recognizes that the
19 Antelope and Triple B Complexes are governed as meta-populations meaning that wild horses
20 interchange throughout the HMAs. (AR at 14161). This factor helps increase genetic diversity
21 even in the face of overall lower wild horse populations. FOA completely neglects this fact in its
22 argument, instead choosing to criticize defendants for removing horses from specific herd families.
23 Moreover, the administrative record directly refutes FOA’s claim that the proposed action will
24 critically destroy the genetic health of the herds. The 2017 Gather Plan specifically analyzes and
25 discusses the genetic health and potential impacts of approve gather on future wild horse
26 populations. (AR at 146, 177). Moreover, no genetic report that defendants consulted concluded
27 that genetic variability was at risk under the governing AML range for each HMA. Finally, the
28 approved plan provides for and includes ongoing monitoring and other efforts to ensure that

1 genetic diversity remains in the complexes. (AR at 29) (stating that genetic health and herd
2 characteristic date will continue to be monitored for the duration of the gather plan). Thus, the
3 Court finds that defendants conclusion that the proposed action is not expected to affect the genetic
4 health because “[a]vailable indications are that these populations contain high levels of genetic
5 diversity at this time” and are likely to maintain that diversity is not arbitrary and capricious. (AR
6 at 153). Accordingly, the Court shall deny FOA’s motion for summary judgment and grant
7 defendants’ cross-motion on this issue.


8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
9 (ECF No. 21) is DENIED.

10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment
11 (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED.

12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court shall enter judgment in favor of
13 defendants the United States Bureau of Land Management and Jill Silvey and against plaintiff
14 Friends of Animals in this action.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 DATED this 17th day of December, 2018.

17
18 
19 LARRY R. HICKS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE